Introduction
Territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property litigation has become increasingly complex in an era where a single advertising campaign can simultaneously operate across physical and digital spaces.
The Delhi High Court’s decision in Hindustan Unilever Limited v. Kwick Living (I) Private Limited, decided on 2 September 2026, is significant in this context. The Division Bench of Justice V. Kameswar Rao and Justice Manmeet Pritam Singh Arora was called upon to examine whether the Delhi courts possessed territorial jurisdiction to entertain the underlying commercial suit arising from an allegedly infringing advertising campaign.
The appeal arose from an order of the learned Single Judge declining, at that stage, to adjudicate Hindustan Unilever’s application for interim relief on merits because doubts had been raised regarding Delhi’s territorial jurisdiction. The Single Judge had referred questions concerning the interaction between Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, Section 62 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 to a Larger Bench.
The Division Bench, however, took a narrower and fact-specific approach to the immediate jurisdictional controversy. It held that, on the admitted facts, the Delhi courts unquestionably possessed territorial jurisdiction under Sections 20(a) and 20(c) CPC.
The Jurisdictional Objection
The respondent, Kwick Living, challenged the maintainability of the suit in Delhi.
Its principal contention was that although the plaint alleged that its goods were available for sale in Delhi, Hindustan Unilever had not placed an invoice or bill demonstrating an actual sale of the respondent’s products in Delhi.
A further objection was that both parties had their registered offices in Mumbai. Reliance was placed upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, which has significantly shaped the jurisprudence surrounding the special jurisdiction available to intellectual property proprietors.
The respondent also contended that the plaint did not specifically plead that it had purposefully availed itself of the jurisdiction of Delhi through digital platforms accessible in the capital.
The issue therefore raised a familiar but increasingly important question: what constitutes a sufficient territorial nexus for an IP action in a market where advertising, commerce and consumer interaction occur across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously?
The Facts That Changed the Jurisdictional Analysis
During the appellate proceedings, the Division Bench sought clarification from Kwick Living.
The respondent subsequently filed an affidavit dated 1 September 2026 confirming that it possessed a GST registration in Delhi and had declared its principal place of business at Naraina Industrial Area before the statutory authorities.
More significantly, counsel for Kwick Living confirmed that the physical hoardings carrying the impugned advertising campaign had been erected in Delhi on 14 August 2026. He also confirmed that the respondent sold its products in Delhi.
These admissions proved decisive.
The Division Bench held that the Delhi courts had territorial jurisdiction because the statutory requirements of both Section 20(a) and Section 20(c) CPC were satisfied.
Section 20(a): The Defendant Carries on Business in Delhi
Section 20(a) CPC permits a suit to be instituted where the defendant carries on business.
The respondent’s own affidavit established that it had a GST registration in Delhi and had declared Naraina Industrial Area as its principal place of business.
The Court therefore concluded that Kwick Living undoubtedly carried on business in Delhi at the commencement of the suit.
This finding is important because it demonstrates that jurisdiction cannot be determined solely by looking at the registered office mentioned in the memo of parties.
A company may have a registered office in one city while carrying on substantial business in another. For territorial jurisdiction, the factual commercial footprint may therefore become more important than the formal corporate address.
Section 20(c): Where the Cause of Action Arises
The Court independently found jurisdiction under Section 20(c) CPC.
The impugned advertising hoardings had been erected in Delhi before the suit was instituted. The Court held that the cause of action had therefore indisputably arisen in Delhi.
This finding is particularly significant in advertising-related IP disputes.
An allegedly infringing advertisement is itself capable of generating a cause of action at the location where it is published or displayed, subject of course to the facts and applicable law. Here, the physical presence of the impugned hoardings supplied a direct and concrete territorial nexus.
The Court consequently did not have to resolve the more difficult question of whether mere accessibility of digital advertising through online platforms, without more, would establish Delhi jurisdiction.
Digital Accessibility Versus Physical Presence
The respondent had argued that the plaint did not sufficiently plead that it had purposefully availed itself of Delhi’s jurisdiction through digital platforms.
The Division Bench’s decision is instructive because it did not rest its jurisdictional conclusion upon digital accessibility.
Instead, the Court identified two tangible jurisdictional anchors:
- the respondent carried on business in Delhi; and
- the impugned advertising campaign physically existed in Delhi before the suit was filed.
This approach avoids the potentially problematic proposition that mere internet accessibility automatically creates jurisdiction in every place from which an advertisement can be viewed.
For digital-era trademark and copyright litigation, that restraint is valuable. Courts may increasingly be required to distinguish between mere accessibility and purposeful commercial targeting or actual commercial activity within a jurisdiction.
The Significance of Sanjay Dalia
The respondent relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia to contend that the suit should have been instituted in Mumbai, where both parties had their registered offices.
The Division Bench, however, found the objection without merit once the admitted facts were taken into account.
The decision should not be read as diminishing Sanjay Dalia. Rather, it demonstrates the importance of first identifying whether ordinary territorial jurisdiction independently exists under Section 20 CPC.
The special jurisdictional provisions contained in intellectual property statutes do not necessarily displace the ordinary jurisdictional bases recognised by the CPC.
Where a defendant carries on business within the forum or where a material part of the cause of action arises there, the court may possess jurisdiction independently of any special statutory forum provision.
Pleadings Matter
The judgment nevertheless contains an important procedural lesson for IP litigants.
Kwick Living’s counsel submitted that the jurisdictional question should be decided on the basis of the facts pleaded in the plaint and that Hindustan Unilever would therefore need to amend the plaint to incorporate the facts concerning the Delhi hoardings and the respondent’s Delhi place of business.
The Division Bench accepted this course.
Hindustan Unilever was permitted to amend the plaint, but strictly to incorporate these two facts. The requirement of filing a formal amendment application was dispensed with, and no other amendment was permitted under the order.
This reinforces an essential principle of civil procedure: territorial jurisdiction must ordinarily emerge from the pleadings and material facts constituting the cause of action.
A litigant should therefore not rely upon jurisdictional facts emerging casually during argument. Where a party seeks to establish jurisdiction through particular commercial activity, advertising, sales or business presence, those facts should be expressly pleaded and supported by appropriate material.
Why the Court Did Not Decide the Merits
Despite being urged to grant immediate ad-interim protection, the Division Bench declined to decide the merits of the competing claims.
Hindustan Unilever argued that the impugned advertising campaign was causing substantial damage to the goodwill associated with its product and sought immediate protection.
The Court nevertheless considered it appropriate for the Single Judge—the court of first instance—to adjudicate the interim application on merits.
This reflects an important appellate discipline.
The Division Bench’s function in the present appeal was to address the jurisdictional impediment created by the Single Judge’s order. Once that impediment was removed, the merits of the injunction application were appropriately left to the court that had heard the parties on the substantive dispute.
The Bench specifically recorded that Hindustan Unilever had already completed its submissions on merits, while Kwick Living was to conclude its response and Hindustan Unilever its rejoinder within specified time limits.
Finality on Territorial Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most important procedural aspect of the judgment is the Court’s express clarification that its finding on territorial jurisdiction was final for the purposes of the proceedings.
The respondent was expressly precluded from re-agitating the territorial jurisdiction issue before the learned Single Judge.
At the same time, the Division Bench clarified that it had not expressed any opinion on the reference order dated 25 August 2026, since that order was not the subject matter of the appeal.
This distinction is crucial.
The judgment resolves the jurisdictional question on the facts of this case without purporting to prejudge the broader questions referred to the Larger Bench concerning the interaction between the Trade Marks Act, Copyright Act and CPC.
Broader Implications for IP Litigation
The decision offers several practical lessons.
First, jurisdictional pleadings must be precise. A plaintiff should identify the specific acts occurring within the forum that constitute or contribute to the cause of action.
Second, corporate domicile is not necessarily determinative. A registered office elsewhere does not eliminate jurisdiction where the defendant actually carries on business in the forum.
Third, physical advertising remains legally significant. In a digital advertising environment, physical hoardings can provide an unusually clear territorial nexus.
Fourth, digital accessibility requires a more nuanced analysis. The Court did not hold that accessibility of an online advertisement is, by itself, sufficient. Instead, its conclusion rested on concrete commercial and physical facts.
Finally, appellate courts may resolve jurisdiction without deciding the underlying IP merits. This preserves the role of the court of first instance while ensuring that an otherwise maintainable suit is not stalled by an incorrect jurisdictional assumption.
Conclusion
The Delhi High Court’s decision in Hindustan Unilever v. Kwick Living is a timely reminder that territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property litigation must be assessed through the actual commercial facts of the dispute, rather than through corporate addresses alone.
The Court found Delhi jurisdiction on two independent grounds: the respondent carried on business in Delhi, and the impugned advertising campaign had physically been displayed in Delhi before institution of the suit.
At a broader level, the judgment demonstrates the continuing importance of Section 20 CPC even in sophisticated trademark and copyright disputes where special statutory jurisdictional provisions are invoked.
For brand owners, the practical lesson is straightforward: jurisdiction must be established through facts that are pleaded, provable and connected to the cause of action. In an age where a single campaign may span hoardings, websites, marketplaces and social media platforms, the territorial question will only become more consequential. The Kwick Living decision provides a useful example of how courts can preserve doctrinal discipline while responding to the realities of modern commercial advertising.