The protection of a famous trademark does not end merely because a third party adds another word to it or makes a seemingly minor alteration to its spelling. The Delhi High Court’s recent decision in Aktiebolaget Volvo & Ors. v. M/s Pooja Lubricant, decided on 24 September 2026, illustrates this principle with particular clarity. The Court granted an ad interim ex parte injunction restraining a Pune-based lubricant business from using the marks “MAX VOLVO”, “MAX VOLWO” and “VOLWO GOLD”, holding that the dominant and distinctive element “VOLVO” remained unmistakably embedded within the impugned marks.

The decision is significant not merely because it concerns a globally recognised automotive mark, but because it brings together several important principles of Indian trademark law: dominant features, deceptive similarity, Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, protection of well-known marks, continuing infringement, acquiescence, and the exceptional nature of ex parte interim relief.

The strength of the VOLVO mark

The plaintiffs comprised Aktiebolaget Volvo, Volvo Trademark Holding AB and Volvo Car Corporation. The plaintiffs traced adoption of the mark “VOLVO” to 1915 and asserted that the mark was coined, inherently distinctive and exclusively associated with the Volvo group. Their presence in India extended across marine engines and spares, trucks, buses, automobiles and related products. Importantly for the present dispute, their registrations and commercial use also extended to industrial oils, greases and lubricants.

The Court noted that the plaintiffs possessed several Indian registrations for VOLVO and formative marks, including registrations relevant to Class 4 goods. It also recorded that VOLVO had been recognised as a well-known trademark in India, and that the plaintiffs had secured numerous interim orders and final decrees against third parties using identical or deceptively similar marks.

This background was important because the Court was not examining an ordinary descriptive or weak trademark. It was dealing with a coined mark possessing a substantial degree of inherent and acquired distinctiveness.

“MAX” could not displace the dominant element “VOLVO”

The defendant manufactured and sold lubricants and allied products under the marks “MAX VOLVO” and “MAX VOLWO”.

The Court’s treatment of “MAX VOLVO” is particularly instructive. It observed that “MAX” is a commonplace and laudatory expression, commonly understood as suggesting the maximum or superior quality of a product. Its presence before VOLVO therefore did not sufficiently distinguish the impugned mark from the plaintiffs’ registered mark.

The important principle is that trademark comparison cannot be reduced to a mechanical exercise of counting differences between two marks.

Where a distinctive and source-identifying element is reproduced in its entirety, the addition of a commonplace prefix may not prevent confusion. In the present case, the Court considered that a purchaser could understand “MAX VOLVO” as a premium or enhanced variant of a VOLVO product, rather than as an entirely independent brand.

The commercial context reinforced this conclusion. The disputed products were lubricants and engine oils—goods for which VOLVO already had registrations and commercial associations. Thus, the possibility of the defendant’s mark being perceived as an extension, variant or product line of the VOLVO brand was not remote.

“MAX VOLWO”: when one letter does not save a mark

The defendant’s second mark, “MAX VOLWO”, presented an even more interesting question.

At first glance, “VOLWO” differs from “VOLVO” by only one letter. Yet trademark law does not ask whether two marks are technically identical. The relevant question is whether the similarity is such that the average consumer is likely to be confused or to perceive an association between them.

The Court found “MAX VOLWO” to be visually near-identical to “MAX VOLVO” and practically indistinguishable phonetically, particularly because the pronunciation of “V” and “W” may overlap in ordinary speech. In the context of lubricants, the Court considered that an average consumer of average intelligence and imperfect recollection could perceive “MAX VOLWO” as merely a variant of VOLVO.

The decision therefore reinforces an established proposition: minor orthographical alterations cannot necessarily immunise a mark from infringement where the overall commercial impression remains deceptively similar.

The Court also relied upon the principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, particularly the distinction between infringement and passing off and the importance of examining whether the essential features of the registered mark have been adopted.

Section 29(2)(b): similarity must be assessed in context

The Court placed the case under Section 29(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, rather than relying upon the statutory presumption under Section 29(3), because the impugned marks were not identical to the registered VOLVO mark in the strict sense.

This is an important analytical distinction.

Section 29(2)(b) requires consideration of the similarity between the marks, the similarity of the goods or services, and the likelihood of confusion or association. Here, all three elements substantially converged.

The defendant’s products included engine oil, gear oil and other lubricants, while the plaintiffs’ registrations covered lubricating oils, industrial oils, greases and related products. The parties’ goods were therefore not merely commercially adjacent; they operated within the same product sphere.

The Court further noted that the products moved through overlapping trade channels and were directed towards substantially similar purchasers, including vehicle owners, mechanics and workshops.

The likelihood of confusion consequently had to be assessed against the realities of the marketplace rather than through an abstract comparison of dictionary meanings.

Ex parte relief: urgency was not assumed, but demonstrated

The order is equally significant for its treatment of ex parte injunctions.

Before granting such relief, the Court emphasised the proviso to Order XXXIX Rule 3 CPC, which requires the Court to record reasons as to why the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay. The Court considered the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, including the seriousness of the potential injury, comparative injustice, acquiescence, good faith and the need to limit the duration of an ex parte order.

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bloomberg Television Production Services India Pvt. Ltd. v. Zee Entertainment Enterprises Ltd., cautioning that the traditional three-fold test of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury should not become a mechanical formula for granting interim injunctions. Reasons must demonstrate why the particular circumstances justify immediate intervention.

In the present case, the Court found that such circumstances existed.

The plaintiffs had discovered the defendant’s IndiaMART listing in April 2026 and conducted an investigation. Their investigator visited the defendant’s premises and observed substantial quantities of products bearing the impugned marks. A purchase was made in cash. The defendant subsequently provided a quotation for “Volwo Gold” products and indicated readiness to supply them to Delhi.

The Court was particularly concerned that advance notice could enable the defendant to disperse or move its stock, making effective enforcement substantially more difficult.

Delay and acquiescence: knowledge is not the same as surrender

Another noteworthy aspect of the order is the Court’s rejection of an anticipated acquiescence argument.

The plaintiffs became aware of the defendant’s activities in April 2026. They subsequently discovered the defendant’s trademark application and filed a protest before the Trade Marks Registry on 29 June 2026. The defendant then sent a quotation in July 2026. The Court considered these steps inconsistent with any suggestion that the plaintiffs had consciously accepted the defendant’s use.

The Court also recognised that mere delay, particularly in the context of continuing infringement, does not automatically disentitle a trademark proprietor from interim protection.

This is an important distinction in practice: a proprietor’s response must be examined in light of what it knew, when it knew it, and what steps it took thereafter. Delay cannot automatically be equated with consent.

The quality-control dimension of trademark protection

Perhaps the most commercially significant aspect of the order lies in the Court’s treatment of irreparable injury.

The Court noted that VOLVO was a coined mark used for more than a century and that continued third-party use could erode its distinctiveness. More importantly, lubricants have a functional relationship with vehicles and machinery. If inferior or defective products were sold under a mark resembling VOLVO, consumers could potentially attribute the consequences to the Volvo group despite the absence of any quality-control relationship.

Trademark protection therefore operated here on two levels.

First, it protected the source-identifying function of the VOLVO mark.

Second, it protected the commercial reputation and quality expectations associated with that mark.

This is particularly important for famous brands operating in sectors where product quality can have tangible consequences for performance, safety and consumer confidence.

The order and its wider significance

The Delhi High Court ultimately restrained the defendant from manufacturing, selling, offering, supplying, distributing, advertising or otherwise dealing in lubricants under “MAX VOLVO”, “MAX VOLWO”, “VOLWO GOLD” or any identical or deceptively similar mark. The restraint extended to online and offline representations, third-party platforms, e-commerce listings and social media. The defendant was also directed to remove the impugned listings, including the IndiaMART listing, within one week of service of the order.

The decision demonstrates that trademark enforcement increasingly requires courts to address not merely physical goods but also the digital ecosystem through which those goods are marketed and distributed.

At the same time, the Court expressly clarified that its observations were prima facie and would not prejudice the defendant’s right to contest the matter after appearance.

The broader lesson from Aktiebolaget Volvo v. M/s Pooja Lubricant is therefore not that every modified version of a famous mark is automatically infringing. Rather, it is that where a defendant reproduces the distinctive core of a well-known mark, uses it on identical goods, reaches the same consumer base and trade channels, and adopts only commonplace or minimal variations, the law will examine the resulting commercial impression rather than the superficial differences.

For brand owners, the judgment is also a reminder that effective trademark protection requires active surveillance, prompt objection, evidence preservation and rapid digital enforcement. For businesses adopting new brands, it demonstrates the risks of treating minor spelling changes or generic prefixes as sufficient distance from an established trademark.

In that sense, the dispute is ultimately about more than “MAX VOLVO” or “MAX VOLWO”. It is about the point at which a supposedly modified mark ceases to be an independent brand and begins to function, in the eyes of the consumer, as another expression of the famous mark itself.